07__BULL.DOC

11/14/2006 8:41 AM

Notes
THE VIRTUE OF VAGUENESS:
A DEFENSE OF SOUTH DAKOTA V. DOLE
REEVE T. BULL
INTRODUCTION
With the death of Chief Justice William Rehnquist on September
3, 2005,1 the inevitable scholarly speculation upon the primary legacy
of the Rehnquist Court began in earnest. Undoubtedly, scholars will
reflect upon the federalist resurgence that occurred during
Rehnquist’s term on the Court and particularly during his tenure as
Chief Justice. Consternation over the decisions of the Court often
reached a fever pitch following the issuance of important opinions
bolstering states’ rights.2 A deeper examination of the Rehnquist
Court, however, reveals a legacy that may be troubling to federalists.
Though Rehnquist famously pared federal Commerce Clause
authority in United States v. Lopez3 and United States v. Morrison,4 he
left Congress with virtually unbounded authority under the Spending
5
Clause in South Dakota v. Dole. Hence, states’ rights advocates are
understandably concerned that Dole may provide Congress with an
alternative route to achieve effectively unlimited regulatory power at
the expense of the states. As a result, numerous federalist scholars

Copyright © 2006 by Reeve T. Bull.
1. Charles Lane, Chief Justice Dies at Age 80, WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 2005, at A1.
2. See Robert F. Nagel, The Future of Federalism, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 643, 643–44
(1996) (chronicling the exaggerated reaction of certain news reporters and scholars to the Lopez
decision).
3. See 514 U.S. 549, 567–68 (1995) (declaring the Gun-Free School Zones Act
unconstitutional as exceeding Congress’s Commerce Clause authority).
4. See 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (declaring the Violence Against Women Act
unconstitutional as exceeding Congress’s Commerce Clause authority).
5. See 483 U.S. 203, 212 (1987) (upholding Congress’s conditioning receipt of 5 percent of
federal highway funds upon states agreeing to raise the minimum drinking age to twenty-one).
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and politicians have proposed multifarious limits upon Congress’s
spending power.
This Note examines the implications of the Court’s Dole
decision, focusing extensively on whether Dole gives Congress a
“back door” to evade the principles of federalism championed by the
Rehnquist Court in Lopez and Morrison. This Note ultimately
concludes, however, that Dole is not such a “back door” and provides
as much protection for states’ rights as is necessary and desirable in
an inherently nebulous area of constitutional jurisprudence. Part I
discusses the importance of the spending power by chronicling the
recent rise of federalist principles that resulted in a significant
retrenchment in Congress’s Commerce Clause power in Lopez and
examining the historical evolution of extreme deference in reviewing
national legislation passed under the Spending Clause. Subsequently,
Part II examines the decision in South Dakota v. Dole in detail and
concludes that its four explicitly articulated limitations on the
spending power are largely rhetorical and place no limit on
congressional authority that meaningfully preserves the rights of the
states. Part III analyzes the prohibition against “coercion” of states
6
noted only in passing in Dole and concludes that it provides the most
promising limitation of federal Spending Clause authority. Though
perhaps unsatisfyingly vague, the prohibition against coercion serves
as an adequate warning against attempts by Congress to wield
unbounded authority under the Spending Clause. This warning
proves to be superior to any proposed bright-line standard in that
more definitive limits on Spending Clause power are likely to fail,
given the inherent ambiguity of the Spending Clause itself. Finally,
Part IV marshals empirical support for the contention that the
absence of coercion requirement of Dole and earlier cases, coupled
with the inherent protections of the political process, has effectively
influenced Congress to exercise less than its maximal theoretical
powers under the Spending Clause, and has provided a meaningful—
if admittedly unclear—federalism-based limit upon Congress’s
spending power.

6. See id. at 211 (recognizing that coercive conditions may be unconstitutional but holding
that conditioning 5 percent of highway funds upon raising the minimum drinking age does not
rise to the level of coercion).
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I. THE INCREASING RELEVANCE OF THE SPENDING CLAUSE
A. The Decline of the Commerce Clause
Historically, Congress passed the vast majority of its regulatory
legislation under the Commerce Clause and relied only occasionally
upon the Spending Clause as a source of constitutional authority.7 For
roughly sixty years, the Supreme Court gave virtually complete
deference to Congress in its efforts to promulgate legislation under
the Commerce Clause based upon purported “substantial economic
effect[s] on interstate commerce.”8 In 1995, however, the Rehnquist
Court’s decision in Lopez repudiated this legacy by holding that
Congress did not have the power under the Commerce Clause to
enact the Gun-Free School Zones Act, an act criminalizing the
possession of guns within school zones.9 According to the Lopez
majority, upholding the Act “would bid fair to convert congressional
authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of
the sort retained by the States.”10 Scholars have debated the
importance of Lopez and the likelihood that it might spark a
resurgence of the federalist values of the pre-New Deal era, but few
dispute that Lopez marked a radical departure from what was
virtually judicial abdication in policing limits upon Commerce Clause
power that characterized the era from 1937 to its issuance.11
Consequently, Lopez justifiably resulted in significant
consternation amongst those who support a strong centralized
government with the ability to regulate in areas in which the states
are otherwise incapable of wielding or unwilling to exert sufficient

7. See Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN.
L. REV. 1103, 1112–13 (1987) (explaining an apparent dearth of interest in the Spending Clause
by the traditionally extensive authority available to Congress under the Commerce Clause).
8. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942).
9. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567–68 (1995).
10. Id. at 567.
11. Compare Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending after Lopez, 95 COLUM. L.
REV. 1911, 1914 (1995) (contending that Lopez represents a declaration of the Court’s intention
to police against excessive expansion of federal power vis-à-vis the states), with Nagel, supra
note 2, at 654 (suggesting that Lopez merely comprises the fulfillment of the Court’s repeated
assertions in prior Commerce Clause cases that federal power cannot be expanded excessively
and some continued role for the states must exist).
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12
control. Further, their concerns were heightened given that most
federal civil rights legislation is promulgated under the Commerce
Clause13 and that such laws may not prove sufficiently commerce
related to pass a stringent application of the Lopez test.
In response to the apparent resurgence of federalist principles in
14
the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, advocates of a strong centralized
government partly shifted their attention to the Spending Clause as
an alternative means of constitutional authority to enact laws that
might not meet the Commerce Clause standard under Lopez.15
Literally days after the Lopez decision, President Bill Clinton
advocated the passage of a law equivalent to the Gun-Free School
16
Zones Act under the Spending Clause. Indeed, now that the Court
has at least partially narrowed the “front door” of Commerce Clause
authority, scholars’ and legislators’ interest in the “back door” of
Spending Clause authority has increased considerably.17

B. The Rise of the Spending Clause
Constitutional authority for Congress to appropriate and spend
funds arises from two sources: the implied power to tax and spend
based on a combination of the Necessary and Proper Clause18 and

12. See Nagel, supra note 2, at 643 (chronicling the responses to Lopez in the popular press
and noting the fear that Lopez constituted the initial step in repudiating much of the legislation
of the Civil Rights and New Deal eras).
13. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964) (upholding applicability of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to a restaurant that purchased significant quantities of food that had
traveled in channels of interstate commerce); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379
U.S. 241, 261-62 (1964) (upholding applicability of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to a motel that
served numerous interstate travelers).
14. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175–76 (1992) (holding that
Congress may not commandeer state governments in forcing them to enact regulations but
rather must regulate directly or proffer states incentives for compliance under the Spending
Clause); Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851–52 (1976) (holding that Congress
exceeded its Commerce Clause authority in applying the Fair Labor Standards Act to hiring
practices of states qua states), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469
U.S. 528 (1985).
15. See Baker, supra note 11, at 1913 (noting President Clinton’s efforts to pass legislation
similar to the Gun-Free School Zones Act under the Spending Clause).
16. Id.
17. See Rosenthal, supra note 7, at 1131 (“If the front door of the commerce power is open,
it may not be worth worrying whether to keep the back door of the spending power tightly
closed.”).
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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19
various constitutional grants of federal legislative power and of the
explicit allocation of the “power to lay and collect taxes, duties,
imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common
20
defense and general welfare of the United States.” Early in
America’s history, Alexander Hamilton and James Madison debated
the significance of the latter source of power,21 commonly known as
the “Spending Clause.” Whereas Madison contended that the clause
merely reiterated the ability to appropriate and spend funds under
the other affirmative constitutional grants of legislative power,
Hamilton argued that the ability to provide for the “general welfare”
included the ability to tax and spend for national purposes beyond the
power implied by the Necessary and Proper Clause.22 The Supreme
23
Court eventually explicitly adopted the Hamiltonian position,
though the Court initially severely limited Congress’s spending power
in areas of authority reserved for the states through the Tenth
Amendment.24 Tenth Amendment jurisprudence atrophied with
time,25 however, and the Court ultimately acquiesced to the right of
Congress to use the Spending Clause to encroach into areas
traditionally within the ambit of state power.
In 1937, the Supreme Court retreated from the Tenth
Amendment limitations on the Spending Clause and allowed
Congress to regulate in areas traditionally handled by state
governments, so long as Congress tied compliance with the

19. Rosenthal, supra note 7, at 1118. For instance, the ability to provide for national
defense through raising an army and navy would necessarily involve the ability to tax and spend
for the upkeep of such organizations. Id. at 1118–19.
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
21. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65-66 (1936).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 66.
24. Id. at 68 (“It is an established principle [of the Tenth Amendment] that the attainment
of a prohibited end may not be accomplished under the pretext of the exertion of powers which
are granted.”).
25. Indeed, Garcia effectively rendered the Tenth Amendment a mere truism, a reassertion
of the unexceptional fact that separate spheres for state and federal regulation must exist. See
469 U.S. 528, 560 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“[T]oday’s decision effectively reduces the
Tenth Amendment to meaningless rhetoric when Congress acts pursuant to the Commerce
Clause.”). In New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), the Court did not challenge such a
contention, id. at 160, but rather noted that commandeering of state legislative machinery is
beyond congressional power, id. at 176, whether foreclosed by the Tenth Amendment or simply
disallowed under the Commerce Clause.
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26
regulations to the receipt of federal funds. Inasmuch as states could
simply decline the receipt of federal funds, they possessed a
legitimate choice of whether or not to adopt the regulations
contemplated by the conditions placed on those funds, and therefore
did not suffer any diminution of their authority.27 The state could
“adopt[] the ‘simple expedient’ of not yielding to what she urges is
28
federal coercion” by rejecting the funds. Of course, past penalties for
noncompliance have been relatively minimal.29 If Congress were to
impose a more extensive penalty on a state for noncompliance, the
state’s ostensible “free choice” could devolve into a mere token
gesture of acquiescing to federal coercion rather than facing
unacceptable repercussions for defying Congress.30

II. TOWARD CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS UPON SPENDING
CLAUSE AUTHORITY
Part I.B suggested the virtually unlimited extent of federal
Spending Clause power prior to South Dakota v. Dole. Dole, unlike
the aforementioned cases, explicitly attempts to define the precise
dimensions of the power and the limits thereon.31 Yet its relatively
terse explanation of these limitations has spawned extensive
speculation as to their extent, particularly in light of the recent
contraction of Commerce Clause authority under Lopez.32 It is
unclear whether Dole offers meaningful affirmative limitations upon
the scope of Spending Clause authority. Indeed, its four explicit
limitations appear to be rhetorical flourishes and effectively give
complete deference to Congress in placing conditions upon federal
funds.
26. See Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 598 (1937) (upholding various provisions
of the Social Security Act that created a strong incentive for states to establish their own
unemployment compensation laws).
27. Id. at 596.
28. Oklahoma v. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 330 U.S. 127, 143–44 (1947).
29. See, e.g., id. at 133 (noting that if a member of the State Highway Commission of
Oklahoma was not removed pursuant to the Hatch Act’s limitations on state agents in political
campaigns, the state of Oklahoma would lose the equivalent of two years of the state agent’s
salary).
30. For a more thorough examination of this possibility, see infra Part III.B.
31. See generally South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (enumerating the various
limits on the Spending Clause power).
32. See Baker, supra note 11, at 1929 (noting that, though Dole acknowledged that
Spending Clause authority is subject to certain limits, none of the articulated limits is
particularly effective in defining the extent of Spending Clause power).
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A. Limiting the Spending Power under South Dakota v. Dole
In Dole, the Court considered the constitutionality of a federal
statute that conditioned the receipt of 5 percent of federal highway
funds upon the states’ raising the minimum drinking age to twentyone.33 The statute thereby attempted to indirectly effect a nationwide
change in the age at which citizens could legally imbibe alcohol, a
type of regulation typically relegated to the “police powers” of the
states. First, Dole cursorily noted that Congress may spend only for
34
the general welfare. It then largely eviscerated this potential
limitation by asserting that “courts should defer substantially to the
judgment of Congress” as to what constitutes the general welfare.35
Second, Dole asserted that the conditions placed upon the receipt of
federal funds must be communicated clearly and unambiguously to
states such that they may form a fully informed, autonomous decision
of whether or not to accept the funds and their associated
conditions.36 Third, Dole required a discernible relationship between
the conditions placed on the funds and the legitimate federal aims
37
sought to be achieved. Dole failed, however, to specify how close the
relationship between the ends and means must be, or the amount of
over-inclusiveness and under-inclusiveness that the judiciary would
tolerate.38 Fourth, Dole cautioned that Congress could not indirectly
violate separate constitutional limitations upon legislative authority
by conditioning federal funds upon the states’ superseding those
limitations.39 The fourth limitation, however, allows Congress to
accomplish indirectly what it cannot accomplish directly because of
Lopez. For instance, Congress could legitimately promulgate
legislation lacking Commerce Clause support under the Spending
Clause; Congress could not, however, violate an express limitation of
the Constitution, such as by conditioning receipt of federal prison

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

483 U.S. at 211.
Id. at 207.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 207–08.
See id. at 207 (failing to specify extent of acceptable over- and under-inclusiveness).
Id. at 208.
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funds upon states’ agreeing to inflict cruel and unusual punishment
40
upon state prisoners.
Finally, Dole noted in passing that conditions placed upon
funds may become sufficiently coercive that otherwise permissible
exertion of pressure may evolve into compulsion and render the
41
attempted persuasion unconstitutional. Interestingly, Dole did not
explicitly enumerate the “coercion” limitation amongst the four
aforementioned direct limitations upon spending power, yet the
“coercion” limitation provides the most promising potential check
upon Congress’s ability to completely usurp traditional state
authority.42
Justice O’Connor authored a powerful dissent in Dole discussing
the third requirement of relatedness.43 Her objections on the basis of
relatedness, however, may more meaningfully be construed as
objections to the coerciveness of the statute.44
B. The “General Welfare” Requirement
Dole implied without explicitly holding that the first
requirement, or the “general welfare” requirement, is merely pro
forma and does not constitute a judicially enforceable check upon
Congress’s regulatory power.45 In any event, present case law suggests
that the “general welfare” requirement at best constitutes little more
than a rhetorical assertion that spending must promote the welfare of
the nation as a whole.46 Promotion of national ends does not imply,
however, that Congress may never regulate in areas traditionally
47
within the ambit of state authority. Indeed, Dole explicitly permitted

40. See id. at 210–11 (“These cases establish that the ‘independent constitutional bar’
limitation on the spending power is not, as petitioner suggests, a prohibition on the indirect
achievement of objectives which Congress is not empowered to achieve directly.”).
41. Id. at 211–12 (noting that the conditioning of 5 percent of federal highway funds upon
elevating the minimum drinking age to twenty-one fails to rise to the level of compulsion).
42. See infra Part III.
43. Id. at 212 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
44. For a more thorough discussion of this point, see infra Part III.D.
45. See id. at 207 n.2 (“The level of deference to the congressional decision is such that the
Court has more recently questioned whether ‘general welfare’ is a judicially enforceable
restriction at all.”).
46. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 67 (1936) (“[T]he powers of taxation and
appropriation extend only to matters of national, as distinguished from local, welfare.”).
47. See id. at 68 (distinguishing the issue of whether “general welfare” encompasses
regulation of agriculture, which the Court does not decide, and considering the issue of whether
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conditioning funds upon regulation of the drinking age, a power
traditionally left to the states. Dole did so in light of the fact that
purely local actions, such as minors’ drinking in South Dakota, may
result in interstate effects, such as inebriated drivers on North Dakota
48
roads. Given the virtually limitless potential for “intrastate” activity
to result in “interstate” effects, states’ rights advocates are unlikely to
derive much firepower with which to challenge Spending Clause
legislation from this limitation.
C. The “Unambiguous Expression” Requirement
The second limitation upon Spending Clause authority, that
Congress must unambiguously convey its intention to condition
receipt of funds so that states may exercise a fully informed and
autonomous choice in accepting or rejecting funding,49 is, by nature,
wholly rhetorical. The limitation merely requires that Congress
clearly express its intentions. For instance, in Pennhurst State School
& Hospital v. Halderman,50 the Court struck down a “bill of rights”
provision, partly enacted under the Spending Clause, because in
passing it Congress failed to convey its intention to impose conditions
on the receipt of federal funds.51 Of course, the Court’s reasoning
partly rested upon the assumption that Congress would not impose
the substantial costs of complying with the “bill of rights” provision
without providing “substantial contribution[s] to defray costs.”52
Assuming that Congress were explicitly to condition receipt of funds
upon compliance with the “bill of rights” provision, however, the
state’s remaining objections would relate to the “coerciveness” of the
legislation rather than its ambiguity. Consequently, Congress may
express even unconstitutional conditions unambiguously and satisfy
the second Dole limitation.
regulation of agriculture violates the Tenth Amendment by intruding on traditional state
authority).
48. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 209 (concluding that the conditioning of funds satisfied the
relatedness requirement since drinking in one state can diminish overall highway safety in
multiple states).
49. Id. at 207.
50. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
51. See id. at 17 (“[I]f Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal
moneys, it must do so unambiguously.”).
52. See id. at 24 (“The fact that Congress granted to Pennsylvania only $1.6 million in 1976,
a sum woefully inadequate to meet the enormous financial burden of providing ‘appropriate’
treatment in the ‘least restrictive’ setting, confirms that Congress must have had a limited
purpose in enacting [the ‘bill of rights’ provision].”).
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D. The “Relatedness” Requirement
Of the four explicitly articulated Spending Clause limitations in
Dole, the relatedness requirement carries the greatest potential to
limit the inordinate expansion of congressional authority. On closer
inspection, however, the provision proves merely to impose an
additional rhetorical limitation upon Congress: It must name and
allocate funds in such a manner that a challenging party cannot
demonstrate that the conditions are unrelated to congressional goals.
Dole further illustrated that the courts will likely render an
exceedingly high degree of deference to Congress in its findings of
relatedness.53
In her dissent, Justice O’Connor legitimately objected to the
broadness of the majority’s interpretation of the relatedness
requirement, noting that such a test would permit Congress to
regulate anything tangentially related to federal highways.54 For
instance, if Congress determined that the location of a state’s capital
unduly burdened interstate travel by elevating levels of traffic, it
could arguably condition receipt of a percentage of federal highway
funds upon relocation of the capital.55
However, Justice O’Connor appeared to have realized the
difficulty of crafting an alternative relatedness requirement that
would more meaningfully limit federal power. Her proposed
limitation on the federal ability to condition funds more closely
addressed the issue of coerciveness of federal conditions, as opposed
to the relatedness of the conditions. Specifically, O’Connor proposed
a distinction between conditions—which could legitimately be placed
upon the manner in which a class of funds could be spent—and
regulations—which went beyond the manner of permissible
disposition of funds and impermissibly intruded into a state’s sphere

53. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 208–09 (concluding that the drinking age condition explicitly
serves one of the primary purposes of federal highway spending, the promotion of safety). Of
course, the majority also asserted that the state of South Dakota did not object to the finding of
relatedness between the condition and the federal aims, id. at 208, perhaps suggesting that the
Court would more closely scrutinize the germaneness of the condition upon the existence of an
appropriately pled objection. Nonetheless, the majority’s express statement that “the condition
imposed by Congress is directly related to one of the main purposes for which highway funds
are expended—safe interstate travel,” id., suggests that it considered the qualifications for
relatedness met.
54. Id. at 215 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
55. Id.
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56
of authority. Congress could, however, facilely circumvent the test
simply by reclassifying and renaming the funds it provides. For
instance, Congress could easily accomplish its aims of regulating
highway safety simply by dedicating a certain percentage of highway
funds to prevention of alcohol consumption by minors. Such a system
would preclude Congress from abusing its regulatory power by
withholding from states a far greater percentage of highway funds
than would be required to prevent alcohol abuse by minors, but
would allow Congress to achieve any desired aim promoting the
“general welfare” simply by appropriately naming the allocated
funds.57 Hence, though Justice O’Connor reasonably objected to the
apparent lack of anything more than an attenuated relationship
between federal highways and underage drinking, her proposed
solution more adequately addressed the dilemma of coercive
conditions and thereby implicitly recognized the exceeding difficulty
of formulating any coherent limitation based upon relatedness of
conditions and federal ends.58

56. Of course, Justice O’Connor’s dissent is equally susceptible to the interpretation that
“conditions” devolve into impermissible “regulations” when they are tenuously related to
federal aims (rather than when they are overly coercive). However, O’Connor derives her test
from the Butler decision, id. at 216, a case that explicitly distinguishes between unconstitutional
regulations and mere conditions upon how money will be spent, United States v. Butler, 297
U.S. 1, 73 (1936). That case nowhere mentions any requirement of “relatedness.” But cf. Baker,
supra note 11, at 1961–62 (arguing that O’Connor imposed a “relatedness” requirement but
failed to reconcile existing case law in neither proffering a definition for “condition” nor
clarifying how withholding two years of pay, at issue in Oklahoma, constitutes a proper
“condition” whereas withholding 5 percent of highway funds does not).
57. For instance, rather than simply allocating to states a bloc of funds designated as
“highway funds,” Congress could parse the funds into various portions reflecting the aims it
sought to achieve, such as “highway safety funds,” “highway maintenance funds,” “highway
traffic reduction funds,” etc.
58. Indeed, O’Connor’s “parade of horribles” concerning the ability of Congress to
regulate the states in otherwise unacceptable ways, such as in conditioning federal highway
funds upon relocation of the state capital, Dole, 483 U.S. at 215, would also seem to fail her
articulated test if construed as an interdiction against coercion. For example, under O’Connor’s
test, a requirement of moving the state capital, an obviously coercive imposition upon state
authority, would comprise an impermissible regulation rather than a condition insofar as the
costs of relocating the capital far exceed any savings in reduced highway traffic. See id. at 216
(“[T]here is an obvious difference between a statute stating the conditions upon which moneys
shall be expended and one effective only upon assumption of a contractual obligation to submit
to a regulation which otherwise could not be enforced.” (quoting United States v. Butler, 297
U.S. 1, 73 (1936))).
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E. The Absence of “Unconstitutional Conditions” Requirement
Finally, the Dole majority imposed the rather unexceptional
limitation that Congress cannot induce states to behave in a manner
that violates the Constitution by conditioning receipt of federal funds
upon such conduct.59 Numerous scholars have addressed the fourth
limitation as a promising check on the power of Congress to intrude
upon traditional state authority. Such proposals, however, even if
instituted, are unlikely to circumscribe Congress’s potentially limitless
authority under the Spending Clause. This Section addresses two
prominent representative examples of such proposals to illustrate the
difficulty of crafting any meaningful limit on federal Spending Clause
power through the unconstitutional conditions requirement.
Professor Albert Rosenthal, as part of a broader examination of
the so-called unconstitutional conditions doctrine, considers the
applicability of the doctrine to the protection of states’ rights. In a
separate section of the article dealing with the protection of
individual liberties, Rosenthal argues for a presumption that
conditions upon federal spending may not be used to coerce conduct
that violates one of the Constitution’s various provisions protecting
60
civil liberties. He recognizes, however, that the Court has taken a
significantly more protective approach when defending individual
liberties against diminishment by coercive conditioning of federal
funds than it has when defending state rights.61
In the field of protection of states’ rights, Professor Rosenthal
proposes that the assumption that states may adequately defend their
interests through the political process is inapposite, given that any
state may find it problematic to lobby both for receipt of federal
62
funds and for removal of the conditions attached thereunto. Yet,
Rosenthal does not propose a presumption against indirect Spending
Clause regulation when direct regulation is otherwise unachievable,

59. Id. at 208. Importantly, the fourth limitation does not prevent Congress from
promulgating legislation under the Spending Clause otherwise lacking support under other
affirmative grants of constitutional power but rather prohibits its conditioning funds upon the
states’ engaging in behavior otherwise barred by the Constitution, such as infliction of cruel and
unusual punishment. Id. at 210–11.
60. Rosenthal, supra note 7, at 1152.
61. See id. at 1163 (“It is striking that in recent years the majority of the Court has almost
never expressed in the civil liberties area what it has said with respect to interference with state
autonomy: If you object to the condition, you have the simple alternative of not taking the
money.”).
62. Id. at 1141.
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as he does in the individual liberty area. Rather, he simply concludes
that more evidence on the ability of states to control conditioning of
funds through their representation in the federal government would
63
be useful to courts in deciding such cases. Though Rosenthal
provides powerful arguments for reexamining the degree of deference
rendered to Congress in Spending Clause cases, he stops short of
advocating a presumption against Spending Clause regulation that
would otherwise fail under any other enumerated power of Congress.
As such, Rosenthal appears implicitly to acknowledge that the
principles of federalism vaguely implied by constitutional provisions
such as the Tenth Amendment are not to be as vigilantly applied by
the courts as provisions dealing with individual liberties. His implied
acknowledgement rests on the recognition that Congress does not
behave “unconstitutionally” and thereby violate the fourth Dole
limitation every time it broadly applies constitutional grants of power
and wields “police powers” of the type typically retained by states.
Professor William Van Alstyne offers a modified version of the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine as a solution to usurpation of
state authority, suggesting that state judiciaries should invalidate
acceptance of federal funds when the regulations attached to the
64
funds would violate provisions of state constitutions. His proposed
approach would potentially achieve the salubrious result of allowing
states to provide more stringent constitutional protections for their
citizens than they are otherwise minimally guaranteed under the U.S.
Constitution.65 For instance, the legislature of California, a state in
which the high court has interpreted the state constitution to
guarantee access to abortion services in public as well as private
facilities, could not legitimately accept federal funds conditioned
upon states’ disallowing nontherapeutic abortions in public health
facilities.66
Unfortunately, Professor Van Alstyne’s brief article, though
insightful, does not address the practicality of states’ refusing funds

63. Id. at 1142.
64. See William Van Alstyne, “Thirty Pieces of Silver” for the Rights of Your People:
Irresistible Offers Reconsidered as a Matter of State Constitutional Law, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 303, 316 (1993) (addressing the right of state courts to invalidate acceptance of funds
through a hypothetical example of a state’s compliance with regulations that violate an article of
its constitution).
65. See id. at 320–21 (noting that Congress’s tendency to “flatten . . . out” differences
amongst states may lead to a net reduction in the protection of civil liberties nationwide).
66. Id. at 317–18.
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67
with attached conditions that violate state constitutions. Indeed, an
exceedingly coercive attempt at Spending Clause regulation, such as
conditioning all federal healthcare funds upon permitting public
facilities to refuse to offer abortion services, could easily render it
virtually impossible for a state to adhere to its desired level of
protection of civil liberties. Under such circumstances, state voters
would be likely to favor an amendment to the state constitution over
losing the funding likely necessary to ensure survival of the state
health care system, and the very conformity that Professor Van
Alstyne fears would result.68
In short, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine seemingly
protects only against the violation of explicitly enumerated
constitutional rights, such as those dealing with civil liberties like the
right of free speech or the right to be free of cruel and unusual
punishment, and thereby offers little protection against the expansion
69
of federal authority into areas traditionally controlled by the states.
Further, though state courts may legitimately require a state whose
constitution precludes engaging in the behavior contemplated by a
condition placed upon federal funds to refuse such funds,70 Congress
may still likely induce compliance, even if through amendment of the

67. See Baker, supra note 11, at 1959 (noting that Van Alstyne’s focus on the acceptance of
federal funds rather than the offering of federal funds leads him to overlook the serious
dilemma that states that reject funds in such a manner suffer a competitive disadvantage vis-àvis states that accept funds).
68. Id. at 1958–59.
69. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210 (1987) (“[T]he ‘independent constitutional
bar’ limitation on the spending power is not . . . a prohibition on the indirect achievement of
objectives which Congress is not empowered to achieve directly.”). The Tenth Amendment
could theoretically provide an independent constitutional limitation on the ability of Congress
to expand its powers into areas traditionally within the ambit of state authority via the Spending
Clause. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 11, at 1923–24 (“The Constitution’s limitations, at least after
Lopez, on Congress’s ability directly to regulate the states can be understood as Tenth
Amendment rights that the states have against the federal government.”). However, modern
case law has suggested that the Tenth Amendment merely comprises a truism and simply
prevents expansion of grants of legislative power, such as the Commerce or Spending clauses,
beyond the limitations inherent in the provisions themselves. See, e.g., New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 156–57 (1992) (“The Tenth Amendment likewise restrains the power of
Congress, but this limit is not derived from the text of the Tenth Amendment itself, which, as we
have discussed, is essentially a tautology. Instead, the Tenth Amendment confirms that the
power of the Federal Government is subject to limits that may, in a given instance, reserve
power to the States.”).
70. Van Alstyne, supra note 64, at 316.
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state constitution, through the imposition of highly coercive
71
conditions upon the funds.
III. DOLE’S ABSENCE OF “COERCION” REQUIREMENT AS AN
ADEQUATE CHECK
This Part commences with an examination of the historical
evolution of the coercion standard, which first received complete, if
somewhat obscure, articulation in the Dole decision. Subsequently,
this Part acknowledges scholarly dissatisfaction with Dole’s vague
absence of coercion standard. As a result of this dissatisfaction,
numerous scholars have called for more meaningful limits on the
federal spending power and have advanced proposals that largely
focus, explicitly or implicitly, upon strengthening the vague
interdiction against coercive conditions outlined in Dole. This Part
relies primarily upon the work of Professor Lynn Baker as
representative of the call for a clearer definition of the ambit of
Congress’s spending power. Ultimately, this Part rejects Professor
Baker’s proposed solution and the concept of a bright-line limit upon
spending power generally. It concludes that the vague absence of
coercion requirement developed in Spending Clause case law
culminating in Dole provides a check upon Spending Clause power
sufficient to deter congressional abuse while maintaining Congress’s
ability to exercise effective control over the use of its funds as
envisioned by the Hamiltonian standard adopted in United States v.
Butler.72
A. Coercion Standard Precedent
Near the end of the Dole decision, almost as an afterthought,
Chief Justice Rehnquist noted “that in some circumstances the
financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to
pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion.’”73 Though
the Dole opinion did not precisely define when permissible persuasive
conditions evolve into forbidden coercive ones, it summarily
dismissed South Dakota’s claim that the conditioning of 5 percent of

71.
72.
73.

Baker, supra note 11, at 1958–59.
297 U.S. 1 (1936).
Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).
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federal highway funds upon raising the minimum drinking age to
74
twenty-one comprised coercion.
In this respect, Dole reflected the longstanding historical
understanding that, as long as the state possesses the ultimate
authority to accept federal funds with their associated conditions or to
reject both, Congress does not interfere with traditional state
authority even if it achieves indirectly through conditioning of funds
what it could not achieve directly through legislation. The state, much
75
as a party to a contract, makes the ultimate decision. Massachusetts
v. Mellon76 reflected such an understanding by noting rather
unceremoniously in dicta that a requirement appended to federal
funds would likely prove constitutional inasmuch as “the statute
imposes no obligation but simply extends an option which the state is
free to accept or reject.”77 Indeed, with the exception of Butler, which
relied upon presently discredited tenets of the Tenth Amendment’s
serving as an independent bar to Congress’s intrusion into areas of
traditional state authority,78 the Court has never held unconstitutional
79
a statute regulating states via conditions attached to federal funds.
Effectively, the corpus of modern Spending Clause legislation
implies the concept that Congress’s irrefutable possession of the
broad ability to deny states of its largesse in distributing federal funds
necessarily entails the lesser ability to distribute those funds subject to
the states’ adopting various conditions associated therewith. The
80
rationale is similar to that articulated in Harris v. McRae, which held
that Congress’s ability to refuse entirely to provide healthcare funds
to indigent patients necessarily entails the ability to subsidize only
certain procedures and explicitly to exclude even medically necessary

74. Id.
75. See Rosenthal, supra note 7, at 1141 (noting the traditionally high degree of deference
accorded to Congress in conditioning federal funds but arguing that such deference is largely
misplaced).
76. 262 U.S. 447 (1923). This decision derives from the pre-New Deal era, when the Court
had an exceedingly narrow view of the Commerce Clause.
77. Id. at 480.
78. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68 (1936) (“From the accepted doctrine that the
United States is a government of delegated powers, it follows that those not expressly granted,
or reasonably to be implied from such as are conferred, are reserved to the states or to the
people. To forestall any suggestion to the contrary, the Tenth Amendment was adopted.”).
79. Rosenthal, supra note 7, at 1110.
80. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
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81
abortions from those subsidized procedures. In short, the greater
power to withhold funding implies the lesser power to grant it only
upon satisfaction of certain conditions.

B. “Regulatory” and “Reimbursement” Spending Standard as
Possible Limit on Spending Power
Recently, scholars have questioned the autonomy-based notions
upon which the courts have seemingly relied in almost universally
upholding the constitutionality of conditions attached to federal
funds.82 One such scholar, Professor Lynn Baker, articulately disputes
the ability of states simply to decline federal funds when they find the
attached conditions unpalatable. Specifically, she asserts that the
federal government wields a monopoly power to tax the citizens of
the various states to achieve its regulatory purposes.83 Given the
virtually limitless ability of the federal government to tax and spend
84
for the “general welfare,” it may unobjectionably tax state citizens to
obtain sufficient funds to achieve its desired ends and then return
those funds to the states subject to a bevy of conditions that achieve
regulatory objectives otherwise beyond the constitutional ability of
the federal government to achieve.85 Of course, the states’
concomitant ability to tax the citizens to achieve their desired
regulatory objectives will thereby diminish, given that only a limited
supply of tax dollars from which either government may draw exists.86
More importantly, politically powerful states may exploit such a
situation to ensure that their favored programs become the
81. See id. at 316 (“[I]t simply does not follow that a woman’s freedom of choice carries
with it a constitutional entitlement to the financial resources to avail herself of the full range of
protected choices.”).
82. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 11, at 1938 (“[The] monopoly power that the federal
government directly and indirectly wields over the states’ ability to raise revenue makes the
states’ financial relationship with the federal government more closely analogous to that of
welfare recipients than to that of public employees.”); Rosenthal, supra note 7, at 1135 (“[T]he
dependence of the state or local government upon federal funds may have become so great as to
destroy the possibility of an effective choice.”).
83. See Baker, supra note 11, at 1937 (“[W]hen the federal government offers a state
money subject to unattractive conditions, it is often offering funds that the state readily could
have obtained without those conditions through direct taxation—if the federal government did
not also have the power to tax income directly.” (emphases omitted)).
84. See supra notes 45–48 and accompanying text.
85. See Baker, supra note 11, at 1937 (“[W]hen the federal government offers the states
money, it can be understood as simply offering to return the states’ money to them, often with
unattractive conditions attached.”).
86. See id.
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nationwide standards, utilizing their control in Congress to condition
receipt of federal funds upon other states’ adhering to their desired
87
regulations and achieving the homogenization that scholars have
88
feared. For instance, if the forty-nine states that do not recognize
marriages amongst same-sex couples were to determine to coerce
Massachusetts into similarly abandoning such a commitment to equal
89
civil rights, they could presumably easily do so by conditioning the
receipt of federal healthcare funds, the administration of which is at
least marginally related to the existence or absence of unions amongst
homosexual couples, upon outlawing same-sex marriage.
Ultimately, Professor Baker concludes that such homogenization
will diminish the aggregate social welfare insofar as the existence of a
variety of “packages” of various rights allows any given American
citizen to locate in the state that most closely approximates his or her
desired level of protection and that such diversity increases net social
90
welfare. To illustrate, were states that permit the death penalty for
first-degree murder, which constitute a majority,91 to condition receipt
of federal criminal enforcement funds upon receiving states’ allowing
the imposition of the death penalty for first-degree murder, the net
result would be negative. The net loss to death penalty opponents,
who would no longer be able to locate in a state supporting their
views, would exceed the net gain to death penalty advocates, who

87. See id. at 1940 (“The problem . . . lies in the ability of some states to harness the federal
lawmaking power to oppress other states.”).
88. See Van Alstyne, supra note 64, at 320–21 (noting that Congress’s tendency to
“flatten . . . out” differences amongst states may lead to a net reduction in the level of protection
of civil liberties nationwide).
89. See Editorial, Sound of Shifting Ground, USA TODAY, Dec. 22, 2005, at 10A
(“Massachusetts allows gay marriage. A handful of states accept or are considering allowing
civil partnerships.”).
90. Baker, supra note 11, at 1950–51.
91. Thirty-eight states possess a death penalty statute, and twelve do not; the death penalty
statutes of New York and Kansas were declared unconstitutional in 2004. Death Penalty
Information Center, Facts about the Death Penalty, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
FactSheet.pdf (last visited Aug. 16, 2006). However, the U.S. Supreme Court recently found the
challenged Kansas death penalty statute constitutional. Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. 2516, 2529
(2006). In People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341 (N.Y. 2004), the New York Court of Appeals held
the state’s death penalty statute unconstitutional, id. at 361. The United States Supreme Court
has not granted certiorari in the case, leaving thirty-seven states that permit capital punishment.
See infra text accompanying note 92.
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would not vastly benefit from the addition of thirteen states to the
92
thirty-seven that already permit the death penalty.
Professor Baker acknowledges the countervailing dilemmas of
states’ failing to adequately protect the rights of their citizens and the
concomitant “races to the bottom” that may result when inadequate
protection of citizens’ rights results in a competitive advantage for a
93
state. She argues, however, that the minimum levels of civil rights
guaranteed in the federal Constitution and the ability to amend the
Constitution when such minimum levels of protection are no longer
sufficient may guard against states’ abuse of their autonomy.94
To thwart the ability of coalitions of states to homogenize state
laws and constitutions by conditioning federal funding upon
noncomplying states’ adopting policies desired by the coalition,
Professor Baker proposes a presumption against conditions placed
upon federal funds that regulate states in a manner that Congress
could not achieve under an alternative constitutional grant of
95
legislative authority. Congress may rebut the presumption by
demonstrating that the spending at issue comprises “reimbursement”
spending, which merely provides states with the capital necessary to
finance projects, rather than “regulatory” spending, which provides
financial incentives greater than those necessary to fund the proposed

92. See Baker, supra note 11, at 1951 (“The net result is likely to be a decrease in aggregate
social welfare, since the loss in welfare to opponents of the death penalty is unlikely under these
circumstances to yield a comparable gain in welfare for those who favor it.”).
93. See id. at 1952–53 (“[C]onditional offers of federal funds are not needed to rid states of
their most pernicious laws: our federal and state constitutions unambiguously prohibit their
enactment and enforcement. . . . [Further,] [s]hould our society reach a substantial consensus
that interstate diversity in some area is no longer acceptable, we can always amend the
Constitution to prohibit the practice(s) agreed to be immoral.”). The classic example is child
labor: states without child labor laws may produce goods more cheaply than those who
promulgate such statutes, given the relative inexpensiveness of such labor. Likely the most
famous case addressing child labor, Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), noted that such
disparities in levels of protection offered may result in “unfair competition” amongst the states
but nonetheless invalidated national legislation aimed at preventing the shipment in interstate
commerce of goods produced by child labor inasmuch as the legislation intruded upon
traditional state police powers, id. at 273 (“There is no power vested in Congress to require the
States to exercise their police power so as to prevent possible unfair competition.”).
Undoubtedly, such regulation of inherently commercial activity would easily survive even the
Lopez standard for Commerce Clause legislation today. See Nagel, supra note 2, at 648 (noting
that inherently commercial activities with even weak ties to interstate commerce are easily
subject to regulation under the Lopez standard).
94. See Baker, supra note 11, at 1952–53.
95. Id. at 1954.
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96
projects. For example, Congress may legitimately reimburse states
for their expenses in prosecuting individuals who knowingly possess
firearms within a school zone, providing an incentive for states to
enact such legislation, but may not condition receipt of a larger
amount of federal education funds than is required to prosecute such
offenders.97
Professor Baker’s article likely provides the most complete
recognition of the dilemmas underlying federal spending legislation to
date, yet her proposed bright-line solution of dividing federal
spending into constitutional reimbursement and unconstitutional
regulation potentially creates more problems than it solves. Under
the proposed system, as Professor Baker recognizes, states may still
strongly encourage if not coerce uniformity of state laws by
reimbursing themselves for programs they have already instituted,
and thereby deplete limited tax revenues available for other programs
in states that do not possess the programs for which reimbursement
occurs.98 Of course, the proposed system nonetheless remains far less
coercive than, for example, Congress’s attempts to condition all
federal funds of a certain type upon enactment of a desired statute or
compliance with a desired regulation.
More importantly, Professor Baker’s system would largely
ravage the ability of Congress to achieve various salubrious policies
previously accomplished through the conditioning of federal funds, by
allowing states to dissect spending statutes and then insist that they
receive full funding less any costs associated with administering the
various conditions. For example, in Fullilove v. Klutznick,99 the
Supreme Court upheld the conditioning of federal public works funds
upon the recipient state’s administering a system of race-based
affirmative action in obtaining contractors to complete the
construction contemplated by the funds.100 Under Baker’s system,

96. Id.
97. Id. at 1964–65.
98. See id. at 1970 (noting the problem of depleted funds but recognizing that every
allocation of federal tax dollars results in such opportunity costs, given that some states would
always prefer that the money be spent differently).
99. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
100. Id. at 478. This Note cites Fullilove merely to provide an example of a variety of
condition placed upon federal funds that cannot be easily analyzed via a typical cost-benefit
analysis. However, though Fullilove has never been explicitly overruled, its effectively
upholding an affirmative action system based upon a quota is almost certainly invalid in light of
the Court’s more recent holding in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 499
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states could insist that Congress determine the actual cost of
administering such a system, which may be nearly impossible to
101
define, and deduct that cost, if any, from the noncomplying states’
share of such funds. In short, Baker simply assumes that the cost of
conditions may be defined economically, an assumption that may
prove spurious for conditions that create more abstract costs and
benefits. Hence, Baker’s proposal strictly limits Congress’s ability to
ensure that states expend federal funds in a manner that achieves the
goals Congress sought to accomplish in providing the funds.
C. Abstractness as a Virtue: A Defense of the Dole
Coercion Requirement
Professor Baker’s bright-line solution potentially places excessive
limits on the ability of Congress to ensure that its funds are expended
in an acceptable manner, and perhaps erroneously assumes that the
value of any condition may be assessed economically. Nonetheless,
the limitations of Baker’s proposed standard do not necessarily imply
that another bright-line solution may not preserve ample regulatory
authority for Congress while providing more meaningful guidance to
lower courts than does the vague absence of coercion requirement
articulated in Dole. For instance, the Court could simply set an
explicit percentage of funds, greater than the 5 percent of highway
funds at issue in Dole, beyond which congressional conditioning of
funds would automatically be deemed “coercive.” Though such
explicit numerical standards are exceedingly rare,102 such a cutoff

(1989) (“While there is no doubt that the sorry history of both private and public discrimination
in this country has contributed to a lack of opportunities for black entrepreneurs, this
observation, standing alone, cannot justify a rigid racial quota in the awarding of public
contracts . . . .”). Nevertheless, affirmative action programs remain constitutional in appropriate
contexts. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) (upholding law school affirmative
action program wherein race is considered as one factor amongst many).
101. Indeed, though administration of affirmative action programs undoubtedly creates
costs for the states, many would suggest that the countervailing benefits produced, economically
or otherwise, outweigh such costs, at least in the educational context. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S.
at 328 (“Today, we hold that the [University of Michigan] Law School has a compelling interest
in attaining a diverse student body.”). In fairness, such benefits should be subtracted from the
costs created by the administration of the system, yet the economic value of such benefits is
virtually impossible to determine.
102. Though admittedly unusual, such a bright-line standard based upon an exact
mathematical figure is not unprecedented in the case law. For instance, in State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003), the Supreme Court strongly
suggested that an award of punitive damages that exceeded compensatory damages by a ratio of
more than 10:1 would be declared unconstitutional as contrary to the Due Process Clause of the
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would provide a clear directive to Congress of the extent of its
Spending Clause power.
Perhaps more realistically, the Court could articulate a more
informative definition of the term “coercion.” Though she ultimately
rejects a strengthened version of the coercion requirement as a
103
legitimate check upon Spending Clause power, Professor Baker
recognizes the potential classification of “coercion” into four distinct
varieties of descending compulsion: (a) “‘no choice at all,’” (b) “‘no
practical choice,’” (c) “‘no fair choice,’” and (d) “‘no rational
choice.’”104 An actor possesses “no choice at all” when physically
compelled to act, such as when someone forcibly commandeers
105
another’s arm to strike a third person. The actor possesses “no
practical choice” when compelled to act by extreme threat of force,
such as when someone threatens to shoot another if he or she fails to
engage in a certain action.106 Somewhat differently, the actor possesses
“no fair choice” when offered an irresistible benefit for acting, such as
when an affluent party offers to feed the starving children of another
party in exchange for sexual favors.107 Finally, the actor possesses “no
rational choice” when offered a benefit that a rational economic actor
would accept, such as when an affluent party offers an impecunious
party nonetheless living above subsistence level an exceedingly large
sum of money for similar sexual favors.108
Though the first two alternatives likely have no analogy in the
Spending Clause context, the Court could potentially sort Spending
Clause conditions into those offering “no fair choice” and those
merely offering “no rational choice,” invalidating the former but
permitting the latter. For instance, Chief Justice John Roberts
recently characterized the position of law schools that oppose the
Solomon Amendment’s requirement of equal access for military

Fourteenth Amendment, see id. at 425 (“Our jurisprudence and the principles it has now
established demonstrate, however, that, in practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio
between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process.”).
103. See Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting off the Dole: Why the Court Should
Abandon its Spending Doctrine, and how a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke it to do so, 78
IND. L.J. 459, 521 (2003) (“Toughening the coercion prong is, we think, unlikely.”).
104. Id. at 520.
105. Id. at 518–19.
106. Id. (noting the similarity of this situation to the criminal law scenario of duress).
107. Id. at 519.
108. See id. at 520 (“[An actor] has ‘no rational choice’ [when] only one alternative is
consistent with the minimum demands of instrumental rationality.”).
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recruiters to on-campus recruitment outlets despite the military’s
discrimination against homosexuals yet continue to accept federal
109
funding for scholastic programs as disingenuous, given that the law
schools could simply reject the funds. Indeed, the absence of federal
funds would likely not prove fatal to most law programs, given the
presence of state and private support, though a school’s loss of federal
funding would certainly result in an overall decrease in quality of
instruction and resultant comparative disadvantage vis-à-vis law
schools that accept the same funds. In this light, most law schools
effectively have “no rational choice” but to accept federal funding,
given that a rational economic actor would sacrifice his or her moral
convictions to receive substantial financial assistance. However, the
same law schools likely possess a “fair choice,” given their capability
of declining the funds and suffering the adverse impact of the
consequent depletion of available resources. Applying such a rule, the
Solomon Amendment would prove to comprise an acceptable
application of the federal spending power, though the condition may
devolve into one offering “no fair choice” if, for example, law school
instruction in a particular region or state deteriorated so significantly
that the court system of the region or state could no longer function
properly.
Unfortunately, such labels do not significantly facilitate the
definition of the point at which acceptable persuasion devolves into
impermissible compulsion, but rather recast the nomenclature. In
short, simply defining acceptable conditions as offering “no rational
choice” and unacceptable conditions as offering “no fair choice”
provides no insight into the extent of coercion required for one to
transition to the other. One could theoretically define conditions
providing “no fair choice” as those that would require states to
discontinue critical programs that cannot otherwise subsist absent
federal funding if the states decline the funding. The state, however,
constitutes an entity that can only act through its duly authorized
agents, the elected representatives, and such representatives would
face political fallout for declining federal funding necessary to
perpetuate the critical state programs. The choice of any given
representative between achieving a desired goal through refusal of

109. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 39, Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and
Institutional Rights, 126 S. Ct. 1297 (No. 04-1152) (2006) (“What you’re saying is, ‘This is a
message—[Laughter]—we believe in strongly, but we don’t believe in it, to the tune of $100
million.’”).
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crucial federal funds and preserving reasonable prospects for
reelection, therefore, appears far more analogous to a decision posing
“no rational choice.”
In short, any conceivable bright-line solution is likely to suffer
the inadequacies inherent to bright-line rules, either arbitrarily
categorizing cases on the basis of some proposed mathematic limit110
or providing some vague verbal classification of cases that provides
little more guidance than a broad term such as “coercion.”
Nevertheless, the law often imposes bright-line standards,
despite their inherent drawbacks, so as to achieve certainty and
consistency in lower court decisions. For more fundamental reasons,
however, any bright-line solution in the Spending Clause context will
almost certainly fail. The Constitution theoretically cannot
simultaneously demand the limitless congressional power under the
Spending Clause, envisioned by Hamilton and accepted in Butler, and
the constricted view of congressional power demanded by federalism,
yet the present constitutional jurisprudence appears to demand
precisely that. Indeed, Spending Clause authority must provide
powers beyond those enumerated in other constitutional grants of
power such as the Commerce Clause, lest the Madisonian approach
be effectively instituted in contravention of Butler.111 However,
Supreme Court cases have repeatedly averred that Spending Clause
112
authority is not unlimited. As such, any attempt to set an
affirmative, bright-line limit on Congress’s spending power will be
assailed as violating the Hamiltonian interpretation of the Spending
Clause and Butler, yet the failure to impose any meaningful limit on
the spending power will be assailed as a repudiation of the principles
of federalism.
Interestingly, following the issuance of the Lopez decision,
Professor Robert Nagle noted a similar contradiction in the

110. Examples would include both Baker’s test, which limits the amount of funds
conditioned to the sum necessary to reimburse states for certain programs, Baker, supra note
11, at 1916, and the proposed test of an exact numerical limit upon the percentage of funds
Congress could condition.
111. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936) (“[T]he power of Congress to
authorize expenditure of public moneys for public purposes is not limited by the direct grants of
legislative power found in the Constitution.”).
112. See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 n.13 (1981)
(“There are limits on the power of Congress to impose conditions on the States pursuant to its
spending power.” (citations omitted)).
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113
Commerce Clause, contending that the Court’s declaring the GunFree School Zones Act unconstitutional merely constituted a step in
the process of “successive validation,” wherein courts favor one side
of an inherently two-sided problem while asserting the importance of
the competing viewpoint.114 Hence, in Lopez, the Court finally
fulfilled its repeated intimations in decisions upholding legislation
passed under the Commerce Clause from 1937 to 1995 that that
constitutional grant of legislative authority was subject to affirmative
limits.115 Similarly, almost all modern Spending Clause decisions
illustrate a similar pattern of upholding the conditioning of federal
funds at issue but reminding Congress, at least implicitly, that an
excessively coercive conditioning of funds will not pass constitutional
muster. Though modern case law lacks any instance of the Court’s
declaring a statute unconstitutional as exceeding Congress’s
regulatory power under the Spending Clause,116 Dole’s clear if
somewhat terse interdiction against overly coercive conditions places
117
Congress on notice that the Court will not tolerate naked attempts
to coercively regulate states in a manner otherwise unachievable
118
under other constitutional grants of legislative power. This is not
dissimilar to the Rehnquist Court’s striking down two Commerce
Clause statutes in Lopez and Morrison while leaving intact a massive
body of statutory law enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause,
arguably simply providing a warning to Congress to behave with

113. See Nagel, supra note 2, at 649 (“[O]ur Constitution only authorizes certain
enumerated powers for the national government, but also authorizes some enumerated powers
that are broad enough to allow congressional control over any aspect of human affairs.”).
114. Id. at 652.
115. Id.
116. See Rosenthal, supra note 7, at 1126–27 (noting that only Butler, the holding of which
relies upon presently discredited notions of the Tenth Amendment, declared a statute
unconstitutional as exceeding Spending Clause authority).
117. The Court presently includes three of the five Justices who joined the Lopez majority
and two traditionally conservative Justices who may show similar deference to states’ rights.
Chief Justice William Rehnquist passed away on September 3, 2005, and was replaced in this
position by conservative judge John Roberts when the Supreme Court began its annual term on
October 3, 2005. Richard Willing, Justice O’Connor Remains Seated in the Swing Seat, USA
TODAY, Oct. 28, 2005, at 4A. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor announced her retirement on July
1, 2005. Id. President George W. Bush nominated conservative judge Samuel Alito to replace
Justice O’Connor on October 31, 2005, Editorial, A New Nominee, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 2005,
at A24, and the Senate confirmed Judge Alito’s nomination on January 21, 2006, Maura
Reynolds, A Stark Division in Vote for Alito, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2006, at A1.
118. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (cautioning that Congress may not
constitutionally impose overly coercive conditions).
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caution in intruding upon states’ rights while providing no clear
boundary that Congress may not cross.
Furthermore, the Dole standard implicitly recognized that states
typically possess sufficient political capital to oppose imposition of
119
conditions that they consider objectionable. Professor Herbert
Wechsler argued persuasively that, with respect to direct federal
regulation, states exercise sufficient control through their influence
upon the election of senators and members of congress and, less
directly, the president, to effectively ensure that their interests are
adequately defended at the national level.120 In the field of indirect
Spending Clause legislation, one could theoretically argue that states
may not as effectively oppose indirect regulation through
conditioning of federal funds as they may oppose direct regulation
through the Commerce Clause.121 Spending Clause decisions,
however, have virtually unanimously asserted that Congress intrudes
less thoroughly upon traditional domains of state power when
regulating indirectly under the Spending Clause rather than directly
122
Indeed, Professor Rosenthal’s
under the Commerce Clause.
contentions that states may find it difficult to oppose conditions while
simultaneously supplicating for funding123 largely reinforces the
prevailing assumption that regulation through conditioning of funds
diminishes state autonomy to a lesser extent than does direct

119. See, e.g., id. at 210 (“The Court [in Oklahoma] found no violation of the State’s
sovereignty because the State could, and did, adopt ‘the “simple expedient” of not yielding to
what she urges is federal coercion.’” (quoting Oklahoma v. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 330 U.S.
127, 143–44 (1947))).
120. Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 558 (1954)
(“Far from a national authority that is expansionist by nature, the inherent tendency in our
system is precisely the reverse, necessitating the widest support before intrusive measures of
importance can receive significant consideration, reacting readily to opposition grounded in
resistance within the states.”). Notably, the Supreme Court cited Wechsler’s article approvingly
in the Garcia decision. See 469 U.S. 528, 550–51, 551 n.11 (1985) (“[T]he composition of the
Federal Government was designed in large part to protect the States from overreaching by
Congress. The Framers thus gave the States a role in the selection both of the Executive and the
Legislative Branches of the Federal Government.” (citing Wechsler, supra)).
121. See Rosenthal, supra note 7, at 1141 (“Whether or not there is enough political
influence at the state and local government level to prevent the more intrusive direct threats to
the autonomy of those governments, the same process may not work effectively to forestall
similar interference through coercive conditions.”).
122. See id. (“[T]he actions of the courts and the comments of some scholars have
consistently assumed that where direct regulation is valid, the constitutionality of similar
interference with the states through conditional funding will be upheld a fortiori.”).
123. Id.
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regulation, given that state legislators would almost certainly oppose
conditions attached to a spending statute were the marginal cost of
accepting the funds to exceed the marginal cost of rejecting them. In
124
short, Wechsler’s insightful and widely accepted conclusions seem
to apply at least as presciently to Spending Clause regulation as to
other forms of regulation, suggesting that courts should not be overly
eager to draw specific lines for when persuasion devolves into
coercion insofar as the states already possess considerable political
capital to oppose such coercion.
IV. EVIDENCE OF THE ADEQUACY OF EXISTING
FEDERALIST CHECKS
If the above arguments concerning the definite existence of
inexact limits upon Congress’s ability to coerce state compliance with
desired regulations prove correct, then Spending Clause statutes
should reflect Congress’s implicit recognition that it must refrain from
plying excessive coercion against states, lest the Court honor its
promises made explicit in Dole and implied in earlier cases that it
shall invalidate truly coercive legislation.
Although Congress could theoretically condition the receipt of
every dollar of federal funding within a specific category upon states’
compliance with every single condition concerning funds in that
category, a review of litigated cases suggests that it almost never does
so, reinforcing the contentions above.125 Instead, Congress typically
(1) conditions only a percentage of major types of federal funding
upon states’ compliance with desired regulations, (2) withholds a set
sum of funding upon each instance of state noncompliance, or (3)
defines funding types exceedingly narrowly and conditions receipt of
that limited variety of funds upon compliance with regulations.
Dole comprises the primary example of conditioning a
percentage of a major category of funds upon states’ compliance with
a desired regulation, and the percentage of funds it withheld is not
126
unreasonable in light of state highway expenditures.

124. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
125. See supra Part III.C.
126. Dole involved withholding of 5 percent of federal highway funds. South Dakota v.
Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987). In 2000, states spent 6.3 percent of their highway funds,
including federal and state sources, on “Highway Law Enforcement & Safety.” U.S.
Department of Transportation, Highway Funding and Expenditures, http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/
ohim/onh00/onh2p10.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2006). Obviously, far less than the entire 6.3
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Oklahoma v. U.S. Civil Service Commission comprises an
example of withholding a set amount of funds upon each instance of
state noncompliance. The state of Oklahoma suffered the loss of an
amount equal to two years of salary of an official who impermissibly
128
participated in political activities, a relatively minimal sum and an
amount reasonably designed to incentivize compliance with the
conditions placed upon the funds but not to penalize the state to an
extent unjustified by the gravity of the transgressions of the officer at
issue. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis,129 though difficult to classify
under the aforementioned framework, largely involved a similar
system of persuading state compliance. In the system involved in the
case, an employer contributing to a state unemployment
compensation fund could vastly reduce his or her contributions to the
analogous federal fund, providing an incentive for states to create
unemployment compensation systems complying with various federal
standards to capture such payments by employers.130
Mellon involved the complete withholding of a very narrow
category of federal funds, those designated for mitigating infant and
maternal mortality during childbirth, upon the states’ failure to
131
comply with various provisions attached to the funds. Similarly,
Fullilove required states to institute a system of race-based
affirmative action in order to receive federal funds for certain
construction projects.132 In short, though the entire category of federal
funds is withheld, the funds within the category are often relatively
minimal and the condition at issue is absolutely sine qua non to
ensure that the federal government achieves its objectives in
distributing that limited category of funds.

percent is dedicated to eradicating drunken driving by minors, but the figure suggests that
roughly 5 percent of federal funds are spent on “highway safety” and that Dole’s permitting
withholding of that amount, though in excess of what would be appropriate “reimbursement
spending,” was not irrational.
127. 330 U.S. 127 (1947).
128. Id. at 133.
129. 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
130. Id. at 574 (“If the taxpayer has made contributions to an unemployment fund under a
state law, he may credit such contributions against the federal tax, provided . . . that the state
law shall have been certified to the Secretary of the Treasury by the Social Security Board as
satisfying certain minimum criteria.”).
131. 262 U.S. 447, 479 (1923).
132. 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980) (“The program conditions receipt of public works grants upon
agreement by the state or local governmental grantee that at least 10% of the federal funds will
be devoted to contracts with minority businesses . . . .”).
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Further, when dealing with such narrow categories of funding,
the Court is hesitant to enforce implied requirements of more
extensive regulation than that necessary to achieve the limited aims
contemplated by the narrow category of funds. For instance, in
Pennhurst, the Court displayed an extreme hesitance to interpret a
“bill of rights” for developmentally disabled persons, which would
result in extensive compliance costs for the states, as mandatory
inasmuch as Congress had only provided extremely limited funding to
the states under a fairly narrow program for assisting persons with
133
developmental disabilities.
Of course, not all statutes drawing upon the federal Spending
Clause power easily fall into the aforementioned framework. For
134
instance, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act,
a statute that specifically raises the prospect of Congress’s
circumventing limits upon its power through the use of the Spending
Clause,135 simply requires all states who receive federal prison funds to
comply with the terms of the Act.136 However, the concomitant
133. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 24 (1981) (“The fact that
Congress granted to Pennsylvania only $1.6 million in 1976, a sum woefully inadequate to meet
the enormous financial burden of providing ‘appropriate’ treatment in the ‘least restrictive’
setting, confirms that Congress must have had a limited purpose in enacting [the ‘bill of rights’
provision].”). The holding of Pennhurst depends largely on the rationale of Harris v. McRae, 448
U.S. 297 (1980), wherein the Court was exceedingly hesitant to interpret a statute to require
states to fund medically necessary abortions when the state and federal government had shared
the costs of funding such in the past, though the Court did note that Congress could perhaps
impose such a requirement were it expressed clearly, see id. at 309 (“Since the Congress that
enacted Title XIX did not intend a participating State to assume a unilateral funding obligation
for any health service in an approved Medicaid plan, it follows that Title XIX does not require a
participating State to include in its plan any services for which a subsequent Congress has
withheld federal funding.”).
134. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2000).
135. In 1990, the Supreme Court held that laws of general applicability that only incidentally
burden the free exercise of religion do not require analysis under strict scrutiny. Cutter v.
Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 715 (2005). Congress responded in 1993, effectively reinstituting strict
scrutiny through the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Id. The Court declared the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act unconstitutional in 1997, asserting that the Act superseded Congress’s
remedial powers under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. The Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act comprises the most recent utterance in the dialogue between the
Court and Congress and applies strict scrutiny in a more limited set of circumstances, employing
the Commerce Clause and Spending Clause rather than the Fourteenth Amendment as
constitutional support. Id. at 2118–19. In Cutter, the Court affirmed the constitutionality of the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act under the Establishment Clause, id. at
2123, declining to consider whether the Act exceeded Congress’s Commerce or Spending
Clause powers because such issues were not considered by the Court of Appeals, id. at 2120 n.7.
136. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc, 2000cc-1 (2000) (requiring all governments that receive federal
financial assistance or that impose burdens affecting interstate commerce to refrain from
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presence of Commerce Clause justification for the statute suggests
that Congress could potentially regulate the states directly without
engaging in conditioning of funds. Consequently, the statute provides
little guidance as to whether Congress could legitimately condition
the receipt of all federal prison funds upon state compliance with the
Act. Indeed, so long as Congress retains relatively broad authority
137
under the Commerce Clause and inasmuch as Congress may validly
regulate states by conditioning any sum of funds so long as it could
regulate the states directly under the Commerce Clause,138 one cannot
confidently assess whether such statutes that impose what would
otherwise appear to be a coercive conditioning of an excessive
amount of federal funds would survive if solely relying upon Spending
Clause justification.
The review of relevant Spending Clause statutes, however,
suggests that Congress often either declines to exercise its potential
power to condition every dollar of major categories of funding upon
state compliance with desired conditions, or invokes a separate
potential constitutional power, such as the Commerce Clause, to
independently justify the legislation. Whether such forbearance arises
from fear of provoking the Court into invalidating an overly coercive
statute or from the success of state representatives in adequately
defending the interests of their respective states in the national
lawmaking forum, Congress seldom withholds such massive amounts
of funds that autonomous state acceptance becomes a chimera.
Rather, Congress typically closely tailors the penalty for
noncompliance to provide a strong incentive for compliance but
preserve meaningful choice.

imposing any substantial burden upon the free exercise of religion of institutionalized persons
or from imposing such a burden through land use regulations unless in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest).
137. A very recent reassertion of the broad authority of Congress to regulate any activity
that may rationally be described as having effects on interstate commerce occurred in Gonzales
v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), wherein the Court upheld the ability of the federal government to
regulate the growing of medical marijuana for personal use under the Commerce Clause insofar
as production of such a fungible commodity altered supply and demand in the illegal interstate
channels in which it typically traded, id. at 2206–07.
138. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 475 (1980) (“The reach of the Spending Power,
within its sphere, is at least as broad as the regulatory powers of Congress. If, pursuant to its
regulatory powers, Congress could have achieved the objectives of the [program at issue], then
it may do so under the Spending Power.”).
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CONCLUSION
When considering the present contour of Spending Clause
jurisprudence, the classic adage “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” seems to
offer the wisest path to follow. The Spending Clause has the potential
to allow Congress to completely supplant state governments in the
exercise of their core police powers, but the principles of federalism
dictate that the courts preserve some limits. The limits articulated in
Dole are admittedly vague and provide little clarity to lower courts in
considering the constitutionality of conditions attached to federal
funds. Dole’s four enumerated limits upon Spending Clause authority
appear to consist more of rhetoric than substance. The Court only
noted the fifth limitation on coercion in passing, and never fully
articulated its precise dimensions. The Court’s attempts to define
“coercive” and “non-coercive” in the Spending Clause context prove
as arbitrary and unsatisfying as attempts to define “commercial” and
“non-commercial” in the Commerce Clause context. Yet, despite its
flaws, Dole may provide as much clarity as is possible in an area in
which precise lines are difficult if not impossible to draw. The sheer
prospect that the Court might break the cycle of successive validation
and strike down a statute as exceeding the spending power induces
congressional caution in the area. The mere shadow of potential
judicial invalidation of a Spending Clause statute provides an
amorphous but real check on Congress’s power beyond that inherent
in the political process. This suggests that Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
opinion in Dole, far from being inconsistent with federalist principles,
actually advanced them. Indeed, Rehnquist’s opinion in Dole
established a framework for Spending Clause legislation similar to
that adopted for Commerce Clause legislation, one subject to vague
limits that nonetheless place Congress on notice of the Court’s
willingness to preserve a continued role for state governments.

